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Critical Apache HTTP/2 flaw (CVE-2026-119618): what you need to know

A race condition in Apache's HTTP/2 module can corrupt server memory and lead to remote code execution on httpd 2.4.55 through 2.4.70. Here's who is affected, what we found, and what to do now.

Billy McDiarmid·VP Customer Engineering
Published: November 18, 2026·10 min read

On November 11, 2026, the Apache HTTP Server Project released httpd 2.4.71 to fix CVE-2026-119618, a race condition in mod_http2 that allows an unauthenticated attacker to corrupt heap memory and potentially execute code on the server. Every httpd release from 2.4.55 through 2.4.70 is affected when HTTP/2 is turned on, and so are several Ubuntu packages with lower version numbers that carry a backported copy of the module. A public proof of concept is on GitHub, and Red Hat says public research has demonstrated a reliable exploit.

On November 12, we searched every Red Sift Hardenize customer's attack surface for Apache servers and contacted the technical lead at every account with hosts advertising an affected version. If you run Apache with HTTP/2, install 2.4.71 or your distribution's fixed package, or turn HTTP/2 off until you can.

Key takeaways

  • You're only exposed with HTTP/2 on. The flaw lies in mod_http2: a server is in scope only when that module is loaded, and a Protocols directive can specify h2 or h2c.
  • Version numbers mislead in both directions. Ubuntu 20.04 and 22.04 report Apache versions below 2.4.55 but ship a backported, vulnerable mod_http2. RHEL 8 reports 2.4.37 and isn't affected at all.
  • Severity depends on the build. Red Hat scores the flaw 9.8 but rates RHEL 9 and 10 as Important, because their mod_http2 packages give each HTTP/2 stream its own memory allocator, which makes exploitation much harder.
  • One upgrade fixes three CVEs. httpd 2.4.71 also closes CVE-2026-106023 in mod_md (Important) and CVE-2026-109163 in mod_vhost_alias (Low).

What happened

mod_http2 is the module that lets Apache speak HTTP/2. HTTP/2 multiplexes many request streams over one connection, and Apache hands those streams to worker threads that run in parallel. Any memory they share has to be locked carefully.

In affected versions, the assign_headers() function writes a header into a table that belongs to the connection rather than to the individual request. Two streams on the same connection can hit that table at the same moment, and the race corrupts the worker's heap. The trigger is mundane. It's a Content-Length: 0 header the server adds on its own, according to the public proof-of-concept lab. The attacker needs no credentials and no user interaction, only an HTTP/2 connection.

At minimum, the corruption crashes an Apache child process. A skilled attacker can shape the heap to go further and run code as the web server user (typically apache, www-data or daemon). Apache rates the flaw critical, and Red Hat scores it 9.8.

The flaw was reported to Apache on October 26, 2026. It was flagged by Anthropic's OSS Scanner and independently found by Anthony Weems and Simon Scannell of Google Cloud Vulnerability Research. The upstream fix was merged on November 9 and shipped in 2.4.71 two days later.

What isn't settled is exploitation in the wild. Wiz said on November 11 that no exploit was available, but Red Hat's advisory now says public research has shown a reliable exploit against a default configuration with mod_http2 enabled, and a working proof of concept is public. We haven't seen confirmed reports of in-the-wild attacks, and CISA hadn't added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of November 19, 2026. Check it again before you prioritize.

Fixed versions by source

Match on the package version your vendor names, not the upstream number. Distributions backport fixes, so a patched RHEL or Ubuntu server will never report 2.4.71.

Source

Affected

Fixed in

Apache httpd (upstream)

2.4.55 to 2.4.70

2.4.71 (November 11, 2026)

Standalone mod_h2 (GitHub)

2.0.8 to 2.0.42

Reports conflict on whether a 2.0.43 release exists. Use the mod_http2 bundled with httpd 2.4.71

RHEL 9

mod_http2 package

mod_http2-2.0.26-7.el9_9.1 (rated Important)

RHEL 10

mod_http2 package

mod_http2-2.0.29-5.el10_3.1, RHSA-2026:98978 (rated Important)

RHEL 8 and earlier

Not affected (mod_http2 older than 2.0.8)

No fix needed

Ubuntu 20.04, 22.04, 24.04, 26.04, 26.10

apache2, including backported mod_http2

USN-9090-1 (November 12, 2026). 24.04 fixed in 2.4.58-1ubuntu8.19

Debian 13 (trixie)

apache2 before 2.4.71-1~deb13u1

2.4.71-1~deb13u1, DSA-6620-1

Debian 12 (bookworm)

apache2 before 2.4.71-1~deb12u1

2.4.71-1~deb12u1 in bookworm-security

SUSE

apache2

Updates of November 14, 2026

Official httpd Docker image

Tags before 2.4.71

2.4.71 tag (November 12, 2026)

The same 2.4.71 release fixes CVE-2026-106023 (mod_md, 2.4.30 to 2.4.70, Important) and CVE-2026-109163 (mod_vhost_alias, 2.4.69 and 2.4.70, Low).

How the ecosystem responded

  • October 26. Anthropic's OSS Scanner and Google Cloud Vulnerability Research reported the flaw to the Apache security team.
  • November 9. The fix was merged into the httpd 2.4.x branch.
  • November 11. Apache released httpd 2.4.71 and published the advisory. Wiz reported no available exploit and no active exploitation at that point.
  • November 12. Red Hat shipped fixed mod_http2 packages for RHEL 9 and 10, Debian issued DSA-6620-1, Canonical published USN-9090-1, and the official httpd Docker image gained a 2.4.71 tag. A proof of concept appeared on GitHub around the same time.
  • November 13. Red Hat scored the flaw 9.8 and said public research had demonstrated a reliable exploit.
  • November 14. SUSE shipped fixed packages.

The good news is that HTTP/2 is opt-in. Upstream httpd defaults to HTTP/1.1, and Ubuntu doesn't turn HTTP/2 on by default, so a server where nobody added h2 or h2c to a Protocols directive isn't reachable through this bug. RHEL 9 and 10 builds are also harder to exploit because of how they allocate stream memory.

That protection stops at configuration. Plenty of teams enable HTTP/2 on TLS sites for performance and forget about it. Patch timing also varied by platform. On November 12, Rocky Linux, Amazon Linux, and cPanel builds were still waiting on fixes, and anyone building the standalone mod_h2 module may have no maintained release to move to.

Who is affected

  • You run Apache httpd 2.4.55 through 2.4.70 from apache.org or your own build, with HTTP/2 enabled. This is the most direct exposure. Upgrade to 2.4.71 and restart.
  • You run Apache from a Linux distribution. The version string tells you little here. Look up CVE-2026-119618 in your vendor's tracker, compare against the fixed package in the table above, and update. Ubuntu 20.04 and 22.04 servers report 2.4.41 and 2.4.52 but are affected, so don't rule them out on the number.
  • You run RHEL 8 or earlier, or upstream httpd older than 2.4.55. This CVE doesn't apply, because those builds predate the vulnerable mod_http2 code. Those versions carry other published vulnerabilities, so "not affected by this one" isn't the same as patched.
  • Apache is inside something you didn't build. Container images, control panels such as cPanel, appliances and hosted platforms often bundle httpd. Rebuild images from a fixed base, and ask vendors directly whether their bundled Apache has HTTP/2 on and when they'll ship a fix.
  • Your servers hide their version. Removing the Server banner stops scanners from reading your version, but an attacker doesn't need it. They can just open an HTTP/2 connection and try. Check these hosts from the inside with apachectl -v and apachectl -M | grep http2 (httpd on RHEL-family systems).

What we found in Red Sift Hardenize

On November 12, the morning after disclosure, we queried the web technology inventory for every Red Sift Hardenize customer organization and pulled each host identified as Apache HTTP Server, with the version it advertises. It's the same approach we took for the recent critical PHP vulnerabilities. We broke down the results by organization, and our customer engineering team contacted the technical lead for each account with hosts in the affected range.

Most of the Apache servers we see don't advertise a version, and that's a sensible hardening choice. It also means nobody outside, including us, can tell whether they're exposed.

You don't need to run this check yourself. When we find hosts in the affected range, our team sends the list to your technical contact. When you review the list, remember the lookalikes in both directions. A host showing 2.4.52 may be a vulnerable Ubuntu 22.04 box, and a host showing 2.4.37 is a RHEL 8 box this CVE doesn't touch.

Know the limits of this data. We matched on the advertised version string, so some of the hosts we flagged may run distribution builds with the fix already backported. This pass didn't filter on whether HTTP/2 is enabled. The inventory we queried comes from Hardenize's browser-based technology detection, so organizations without that feature turned on aren't fully represented. External scanning also can't see which modules are loaded or which patches a package carries. Treat our results as a starting list, and confirm on the host.

What you should do

  • Find every Apache server with HTTP/2 on. Run apachectl -v and apachectl -M | grep http2 on each host, then search your configs for h2 or h2c in Protocols directives. From outside, curl -sI --http2 https://your-host shows whether a server negotiates HTTP/2. Include hosts that hide their version.
  • Install the fix. Upgrade upstream builds to httpd 2.4.71. On distributions, install the fixed package from your vendor's advisory (dnf update mod_http2 on RHEL 9 and 10, apt update && apt install --only-upgrade apache2 on Debian and Ubuntu), then restart httpd. Installing a package without restarting leaves the old code running.
  • Rebuild containers. Pull the 2.4.71 httpd image or a patched distribution base, rebuild, and redeploy. Updating the registry alone doesn't change what's running.
  • Get answers from vendors. For appliances, control panels and hosted platforms that bundle Apache, ask whether HTTP/2 is on and when the fix ships, and track the reply.
  • Test the real path. After patching, confirm from outside that the production hostname still negotiates the protocols you expect and serves traffic normally, not just that a test box looks right.
  • Isolate what you can't update. Turn HTTP/2 off on those hosts (below), or put them behind a patched reverse proxy or load balancer that terminates HTTP/2 and speaks HTTP/1.1 to the backend.

Interim mitigation for CVE-2026-119618

  • Set Protocols http/1.1 in the main server config and every virtual host that sets its own Protocols line. A vhost-level directive overrides the global one, so check them all.
  • To remove the module entirely, run a2dismod http2 and restart on Debian and Ubuntu. On RHEL-family systems, comment out the LoadModule http2_module line in /etc/httpd/conf.modules.d/10-h2.conf and restart.
  • Confirm the change with the curl check above. The server should fall back to HTTP/1.1.

Apache hasn't published an official workaround, and turning off HTTP/2 incurs some performance overhead. Treat this as a bridge to patching, not a replacement for it.

How Red Sift can help

The hardest part of a web server CVE is the first hour, when you need a list of every internet-facing host running the affected software, including the ones nobody remembers deploying. Red Sift Hardenize keeps that list current by continuously discovering your domains, hostnames, and IP addresses, as well as cloud assets in AWS, Azure, and GCP, and recording the web technologies and versions each exposes. When this CVE landed, finding Apache across our customers' estates was a query, not a scramble, and when it turned up hosts in the affected range, we told those customers directly.

See every internet-facing host in your estate, and what's running on it, with Red Sift Hardenize.

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Billy McDiarmid
Billy McDiarmid
VP Customer Engineering

Billy is a solutions engineering leader, technologist, cybersecurity advocate, and researcher. As VP of Customer Engineering at Red Sift, he leads a global team helping security professionals create a safer internet.